Well, and even it had antecedents going back to January and even November of 2023. So these ideas have been around for a long time.

But I think the two inflection points are the election of Donald Trump and the pressure he put on Prime Minister Netanyahu, which builds on pressure from the Israeli public and the Israeli military to make such a deal. I think Netanyahu — Trump was very clear that he did not want this war to go on during his inauguration.

And on the other hand, a major change of power within Hamas, inflected mainly by the fall of the Assad regime, which signals the rise of Turkey and Qatar in the region, at the expense of Iran and Hezbollah, and shifts power within Hamas away from the gunmen on the ground in Gaza who did the October 7 attack back to the politicians, the politburo, that have left Qatar, but are now gathered in Turkey.

And the main regional card that Hamas can play now is not the military links they have with Iran, but the political and diplomatic links they have with Turkey and Qatar. And Turkey and Qatar don't want this war to go on. So between pressure on those two sides, you got a deal.

David Makovsky, there was a temporary cease-fire that was in place in November of 2023 that fell apart after a week. It fell apart on the eighth day. What's different about this agreement or what's different about the climate that might suggest the cease-fire deal might be more enduring?

David Makovsky, Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy: Like you said, that was the last big point was November, when 105 hostages were released for a few days of cease-fire. This is a much more ambitious effort in terms of not just a few days, but at least 42. And we hope it's extended.

Your heart goes out to the families of these hostages who are being reunited and also to the people of Gaza who are going to get relief. I agree with Hussein Ibish that there's been a convergence of factors here. I mean, I agree with President Biden when he said it happened because of the extreme pressure on Hamas that it's been under, and Nick Schifrin and his setup piece about that, losing Hezbollah — they were fighting in stereo.

And now they're — Hezbollah is out of the war after the death of Sinwar, the death of Nasrallah and the decapitation and the weakening of Iran, Biden said the weak — the worst than in decades — its weakest in decades, and the transition between governments, clearly, the fact that I think there's unprecedented in American history that an in going and outgoing administration were sitting at the same table to get this done.

They can't agree between Biden and Trump if it's light or dark outside, but they could agree on this. And — but all these people want to be in the good graces of the United States, of a new administration. And I think that was also part of it as well.

But I guess I disagree a little bit with Hussein in that I don't think it's just the external elements of Hamas. The people that hold the keys to the hostages are in Gaza. And those are the people who are doing the killing. And so I think, without weakening them, you would not have had a deal.

Look, this is going to be hard.

I think what the Trump administration is counting on is that Netanyahu in a certain way wants to turn the page and have a much broader conversation with the incoming administration about regional opportunities and regional challenges.

The opportunity is, is a normalization deal with the Saudis, which you have to credit the Biden people. They are the ones who did a lot of the work on this, but Trump might get the benefit of it. And that is something the Israelis want very much as part of a wider mega-deal with Saudi Arabia and the United States. That is the opportunity.

And the challenge is, what do you deal with Iran now that it has been weakened? Some of you know I like sports metaphors. And this is like — Iran is like a soccer team without a goalie. They have no air defenses right now. So, is this a way to leverage getting Iran to the table on nuclear terms that they wouldn't agreed to before?

But this is a broader conversation. It goes way beyond Gaza. There is an opportunity here for Netanyahu to engage the administration. If everything is just Gaza, Gaza, Gaza, it is going to be much harder to have that conversation that I think both the U.S. and Israel want to have.

So I do think there is an incentive there that should not be overlooked.