BALTIMORE — Just a few days shy of the 1-year anniversary of the Key Bridge collapse, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) gave an update on the investigation. The update was not about what happened on March 26th, but about what could have been done to prevent it.

During a Thursday press conference in Washington D.C., the NTSB said the Maryland Transportation Authority (MDTA) failed to take action to protect the Key Bridge, despite nationwide recommendations to do so, dating back decades.

Back in 1991, after the 1980 Sunshine Skyway Bridge collapse in Florida, the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) issued recommendations to all U.S. bridge owners: conduct a vulnerability assessment to identify how at risk your bridge is of collapsing from a ship collision. According to NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy, the MDTA never did it - neither for the Key Bridge or the Chesapeake Bay Bridge - despite MDTA officials sitting on the very subcommittee that issued those recommendations.

AASHTO reiterated this guidance again in 2009 after it revised its bridge design standards. Again, the MDTA did nothing.

After the bridge collapse in March, the NTSB did the math for the Key Bridge on its own. Homendy said, when her team asked the MDTA for the data needed to perform these calculations - such as information about vessel traffic passing under the bridge - the MDTA simply didn't have it.

"Had they ran the calculation on the Francis Scott Key Bridge, the MDTA would've been aware that the bridge was almost 30 times greater than the risk threshold AASHTO sets for critical essential bridges. 30 times greater," Homendy said.

Homendy said explicitly during the press conference- the MDTA could have prevented its bridge from collapsing.

Over the last year, the NTSB has identified 68 bridges in 19 states that have also failed to conduct a vulnerability assessment. Homendy says these bridges currently have "an unknown level of risk of collapse from a vessel collision." The MDTA is now calling on those bridge owners to do the assessment, and implement changes if necessary.

The Chesapeake Bay Bridge is included in that list. As of October 2024, Homendy stated that the MDTA had not even begun to conduct a risk assessment on the Bay Bridge, months after the Key Bridge collapsed.

The NTSB's report, recommendations, and list of bridges that have yet to conduct a vulnerability assessment, can be found here, on page 22 .

Back in July, WMAR-2 News asked the MDTA about its data on the risk of collapse for the Key Bridge. The MDTA replied that it doesn't have the data, because it's "used only when designing a new structure to determine if/where pier protection is needed."

When asked directly about the MDTA's response to WMAR-2 News during Thursday's press conference, Homendy said: "They might want to read their own guidance. They were on the AASHTO executive committee in 1991, and they were on the subcommittee that developed the 1991 guidance, and the 2009 update. It says, very clearly on like page three: you should do the same calculation and risk assessment, and put protective measures in place, for your existing bridges, before this guidance came out. So there's no excuse."

The NTSB is also recommending FHWA, the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers establish an interdisciplinary team to provide guidance and assistance to bridge owners on evaluating and reducing the risk, which could mean infrastructure improvements or operational changes.

The full report on what happened the day of the collapse isn't expected until the fall. Information from the Voyage Data Recorder on board the Dali should be released in the coming weeks, Homendy said today.